U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal: Risks and Controversies

What It Is

The U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal, formally a "123 agreement," is a civil nuclear accord signed last month by Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman. This deal enables a study of Saudi Arabia's economic viability to enrich uranium domestically to fuel its own plants. Such enrichment was prohibited in a recent deal with the United Arab Emirates, a standard hailed as the "gold standard" for nuclear cooperation. However, the Saudi deal introduces different terms, making it a departure from the UAE agreement. Notably, Saudi Arabia agrees to nuclear inspections but stops short of signing the U.N. nuclear agency's additional protocol for verification. The deal also allows for a feasibility study of domestic uranium enrichment, a significant shift from previous U.S. nuclear agreements.

Beyond the Nuclear Plant

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are working together to encourage Saudi Arabia to diversify its energy sources, and this nuclear deal is a central part of that effort. Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil exporter, and the diversification away from fossil fuels is a critical aspect of the country's economic future, but the deal comes with geopolitical implications. Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has publicly stated that if Iran develops a nuclear bomb, Saudi Arabia will follow suit. This has sparked concerns, particularly among U.S. lawmakers, about the potential for nuclear weapons proliferation in the region. The debate hinges on whether the deal provides sufficient safeguards against Saudi Arabia developing nuclear weapons.

The Battle of the Deal

The Two Sides

The debate over the U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal is polarized. On one side, Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA) argues that the deal is inadequate and could potentially lead to Saudi Arabia developing nuclear weapons. The agreement allows for the possibility of domestic uranium enrichment after a two-year study, a concern for Sherman, who points out that Saudi Arabia was the home to the vast majority of the 9/11 hijackers. Sherman also criticizes the deal's inspection provisions, arguing that they are not robust enough to prevent covert nuclear activities. On the other side, Dan Poneman, former Deputy Secretary of Energy and current distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, argues that the deal provides the best nonproliferation outcome available. He points out that the deal includes robust inspection rights implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency and that the U.S. will be the exclusive partner in Saudi Arabia's nuclear program. Poneman also argues that if the U.S. does not partner with Saudi Arabia, other countries like Russia or China could, and they would not provide the same level of transparency and protection.

Verification Challenges

A core concern raised by Sherman is the verification process. The U.S.-Saudi agreement allows for short-notice inspections during regular working hours, but Sherman argues that this is insufficient. He points out that the deal does not allow for inspections at undeclared sites, where covert activities could potentially take place. Poneman, however, argues that the deal's exclusivity provision means that any nuclear activities outside of the agreement would violate Saudi Arabia's full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, potentially leading to special inspections.

Enrichment and Proliferation

The agreement's provisions for domestic uranium enrichment are another point of contention. Sherman argues that allowing Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium domestically, even with U.S. consent, is a significant proliferation risk. He points out that Saudi Arabia has publicly stated that it would develop nuclear weapons if Iran does, and that the current deal does not do enough to prevent this. Poneman, however, argues that the deal's provisions for robust inspections and the exclusivity of the U.S. partnership provide sufficient safeguards against proliferation. He also points out that the black box system proposed by the Biden administration would ensure that Saudi Arabia has no access to the enrichment technology, even if the enrichment takes place in Saudi Arabia.

Geopolitical Calculations

Global pressures shape the debate. Poneman advocates for the U.S. as the partner of choice for nonproliferation, asserting that the deal is in the long-term strategic interest of the U.S. He argues that partnering with Saudi Arabia is better than letting other countries, like Russia or China, take the lead. Sherman, however, is skeptical of Saudi Arabia's intentions, pointing to its historical ties to terrorism and the unpredictability of its future leadership. He argues that a promise not to develop nuclear weapons is not enough, citing past broken promises from North Korea and Iran.

Eye on the Region

For those following geopolitics in the Middle East, several steps can help evaluate this deal. First, track the progress of the two-year study on uranium enrichment and monitor any changes in Saudi Arabia's stance on nuclear weapons. Second, pay attention to the implementation of the inspection regime and any requests for special inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Third, keep an eye on the broader geopolitical context, including Iran's nuclear program and the dynamics of U.S.-Saudi relations. Finally, stay informed about any developments in Saudi Arabia's domestic politics, as the stability of the royal family could impact the deal's future. Engage with experts and analysts who specialize in nuclear nonproliferation and Middle East politics to gain deeper insights into the implications of this deal.